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ABSTRACT A recent strand of aid programming aims to develop household assets by removing the stresses
associated with meeting basic nutritional needs. In this study, the authors posit that such nutrition-sensitive
programmes can reduce malnourishment by encouraging further investment in diet. To test this hypothesis, they
analyse the World Food Programme’s (WFP) Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO), in Niger,
a conflict-affected, low-income country with entrenched food insecurity. Under the PRRO, a household falls into
one of three groups at end line: receiving no assistance, receiving nutrition-specific assistance, or receiving
nutrition-specific assistance and nutrition-sensitive food for assets-based programming. If provided alone, food
aid has no nutritional impact relative to receiving no assistance. However, the study observes pronounced
positive effects if food aid is paired with assets-based programming. The authors conclude, first, that certain
forms of food aid function well in complex, insecure environments; second, that assets-based programmes
deliver positive nutritional spillovers; and, third, that there are theoretical grounds to believe that assets-based
nutrition-sensitive programmes interact positively with nutrition-specific programming.
1. Introduction
The theories of change that link food aid to improved nutrition are intuitive (Barrett &
Maxwell, 2007; Kennedy & Alderman, 1987; Maxwell & Singer, 1979), but empirical studies
share three features that inhibit generalisability. The first is that most look at the performance
of food aid in the aftermath of shocks (del Ninno, Dorosh, & Subbarao, 2007; Gilligan &
Hoddinott, 2007; Quisumbing, 2003; Tusiime, Renard, & Smets, 2013; van der Veen &
Gebrehiwot, 2011; Yamano, Alderman, & Christiaensen, 2005). By contrast, less is known
about how food aid performs in situations of chronic malnutrition. The second is a tendency to
focus on nutrition-specific programming (IOD PARC, 2014; van der Veen & Gebrehiwot,
2011; World Food Programme [WFP], 2016), which aims to address the immediate determi-
nants of nutrition, such as calorie intake. There is macro-level evidence on the positive
outcomes of nutrition-sensitive aid, which aims to boost nutrition by targeting the root causes
of malnutrition (Mary, Saravia-Matus, & Paloma, 2018; Ruel & Alderman, 2013), but less is
known about how these outcomes are supported at the programme level.1 The third is a focus
on scenarios that are ideal for food aid to perform well (IOD PARC, 2014; WFP, 2016),
specifically, locations with stable populations, access to health centers, and no threats of
fragility.
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This study poses three research questions to address these concerns. First, it tests the performance
of a nutrition assistance programme in the context of chronic food insecurity. Second, it compares the
relative performance of nutrition-specific and asset-based nutrition-sensitive programme arms. Third,
it contextualises the findings in a highly fragile environment. It hypothesises that gains from direct
food provision will be lost once the programme cycle ends because the causes of food insecurity have
not been tackled. By contrast, the increase in assets provided by nutrition-sensitive interventions adds
to household wealth and therefore to the capacity of households to sustain gains. Because assets can
be liquidated to provide coping strategies, this form of provision is well placed to overcome external
risks in highly fragile environments, which can interrupt both the supply of and the demand for
nutrition-specific aid.
To test these hypotheses, the study investigates the World Food Programme’s (WFP) Protracted
Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) in Niger. From 2014 until 2016, the PRRO provided poor
households with ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF). A subset of these households also benefited
from a Food for Assets (FFA) Programme, which builds assets, first, by providing seedlings to
households, which then grow trees that can be sold or used as lumber and, subsequently, through the
rehabilitation of the land on which the trees are grown. The study collected two waves of household
panel data, the first shortly before the programme began and the second three months after it finished.
At end line, households fall into three distinct groups: those that received no assistance in the
previous year, those that received only nutrition-specific assistance, and those that received both
nutrition-specific assistance and nutrition-sensitive assistance.
Rollout could not be randomised because of the complex scenario, and sample attrition was compara-
tively high, which is not atypical in difficult environments. For these reasons, the study adopted a tailored
set of econometric analyses to mitigate biases. It constructed two versions of the database: a child-level
panel, on which the main analyses were based, and a household panel, in which nutrition indicators are
averaged across all children in the household. The study used propensity score matching (PSM)
approaches to account for non-random rollout, with an instrumental variable (IV) based on the spatial
lag of insecurity used to ensure robustness. Attrition is treated as a Heckman-style selection problem.
A quirk of the scenario studied provides the criterion. Households in villages scheduled for enumeration
on Fridays are significantly more likely to leave the sample than households scheduled on other days.
Niger has a majority Muslim population and a high degree of religiosity, resulting in reduced productivity
(including among the enumerators) during the Jumu’ah (Friday prayer).
Using these corrections, the analyses follow difference in difference estimations to test for the
relative performance of both the nutrition-specific-only (NSO) and nutrition-specific–nutrition-
sensitive (NSNS) treatment arms against the reference group. They show no statistical differences
between the NSO and reference groups. By contrast, the mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) is,
on average, 1.916 millimeters larger among the NSNS group than among the children in the reference
group and 2.687 millimeters larger among the NSNS group than among the children in the NSO
group.2 A marginal exogenous increase in assets would boost the MUAC by about 0.67 millimeters,
suggesting that the impact of the NSNS assistance is substantial. The results are robust across various
specifications, across IV and PSM analyses, and across the individual and household panels. They
confirm the hypothesis that, in situations of high fragility and of entrenched, chronic malnutrition,
medium-term effects can be delivered by a combination of nutrition-sensitive programming and
nutrition-specific programming, but not by nutrition-specific programming provided in isolation.
In the case of chronic malnutrition, this finding is intuitive. In emergency scenarios, short-term assistance
bridges temporary food security problems, rather than tackling the underpinning causes. Moreover, in
a scenario characterised by security threats and weak institutional capacities, different intervention typol-
ogies offer different implications.3 Low capacities or damage to existing capacities likely disrupt the supply
chains that provide RUTF, while also inhibiting demand. Individuals become less willing to travel long
distances if infrastructure is weak or if travel is dangerous. Compared with nutrition-specific programmes,
such threats are less likely to disrupt asset-based nutrition-sensitive programming, at least once the
programming has been rolled out, because supply lines and the process of demand are less complex.4
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The remainder of this presentation is structured as follows. The next section offers a brief theoretical
background on why nutrition-specific programmes and nutrition-sensitive programmes might perform
differently in this scenario. Section 3 discusses the PRROand the related theories of change, implementation,
and rollout. Section 4 presents the data and the analytical methods. Section 5 examines the results. Section 6
concludes.
2. Background
Nutrition-specific programmes are characterised by efforts to increase calorie intake and thereby enhance
nutrition either by the direct provision of supplements or indirect provision through, for example, food
stamps (Beaton & Ghassemi, 1982; Mora, Herrera, Suescun, de Navarro, & Wagner, 1981). By contrast,
nutrition-sensitive programming relies on more complex theories of change. Impacts arise from income
effects (Cunha, 2014) and associated impacts on the food Engels curve (Cruz & Ziegelhöfer, 2014;
Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). Such programmes are accompanied by assumptions about household beha-
viours, especially if all children are to benefit (Jacoby, 2002). Although more complicated, the study here
argues that the theories of change implicit in nutrition-sensitive programming are more tractable in
complicated, fragile, and chronically food insecure places.
To illuminate this issue, the analysis draws lessons from literature that compares in-kind provision
and cash transfers. The logic is as follows: nutrition-specific assistance is an in-kind transfer, directly
providing RUTF. The nutrition-sensitive programme, then, corresponds to the logic of an uncondi-
tional cash transfer because households can use gains as they please, without any requirement to
invest the gains in diet.
Both cash transfers and in-kind assistance are known to boost health and nutrition indicators (Akresh,
de Walque, & Kazianga, 2016; Gentilini, 2016; Hidrobo, 2014; Hidrobo, Hoddinott, Peterman,
Margolies, & Moreira, 2014; Skoufias, Unar, & González-Cossío, 2008). Cash transfers perform at
least as well and, often, better (Afkar &Matz, 2015). Large proportions of cash transfers are consumed as
food (Barrett & Lentz, 2013; Harvey & Marongwe, 2006). When the transfer is insufficient to cover all
needs, impacts can be attributed to income effects (Cunha, 2014), but increases in food consumption are
often larger than this effect (Cruz & Ziegelhöfer, 2014; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009).
In the case of chronic malnutrition, any programme that does not tackle the root causes of food
insecurity is unlikely to have impacts outside the programme period (Maxwell, Webb, Coates, &
Wirth, 2010; Ruel & Alderman, 2013). Especially if the malnutrition involves capacity constraints,
rather than knowledge constraints (Baird, Ferreira, Özler, & Woolcock, 2014), unconditional pro-
gramming should work well in any situation. By contrast, the nutrition-specific assistance arm
examined here tackles neither the income constraints nor the production constraints that underpin
chronic food insecurity in Niger. If assistance is removed, one would therefore anticipate
a convergence to previous trends. However, the semipermanent increase in income implied by the
nutrition-sensitive programme suggests that income constraints are partially relaxed. This provides
the basis for gains to be sustained into the medium term in chronically food insecure environments.
In cases of fragility, the analysis is more practical in its considerations. Nutrition-specific pro-
grammes place restrictions on what is provided, how what is provided can be accessed, and how what
is provided can be used. These modalities must be supported by meaningful delivery structures and
oversight. Beneficiaries must travel – sometimes, long distances – to centers to receive their
entitlements. Given the damage to normal economic interactions because of violence and fragility
(Barbieri & Levy, 1999; Jha, 2013), it would be naive to believe that such threats do not interact with
nutrition-specific provision. Supply lines are damaged during episodes of violence (Coward, 2009),
and individuals are less likely to travel to distant health centers if they perceive the way to be
dangerous. Displacement could further inhibit access.
While assets may be targeted, violence and fragility interrupt the basic provision of nutrition-sensitive
programming to a lesser degree. First, such forms of treatment do not require ongoing provision or deep
support structures, suggesting that there is less disruption on the supply side. Similarly, there are no
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ongoing commitments among recipients to travel and thus less room for demand-side disruption.
Additional assets provide coping strategies that are not available in the case of in-kind provision.5
Based on this intuition, the analysis develops three hypotheses, as follows:
● Nutrition-specific programming leads to a temporary improvement in nutrition indicators that
converges to underlying levels in the postprogramme period. The empirical prediction depends on
the duration of this convergence period.6
● The addition of nutrition-sensitive programming allows these temporary boosts to be sustained in
the medium term. Recipients of NSNS assistance will exhibit elevated nutrition indicators
compared with the reference group. If households experience income constraints, rather than
knowledge constraints, the NSNS group will also exhibit elevated nutrition indicators relative to
the NSO group.
● Nutrition-sensitive programming increases household food consumption capacity through income
effects, leading to improvements in nutrition status, regardless of the provision of nutrition-
specific programming. Nutrition-sensitive programming is well placed to boost nutrition
in situations of chronic food insecurity and political fragility.
Broadly, these hypotheses correspond to the conclusions of Langendorf et al. (2014), who propose
that mixed strategies, involving food supplements and a cash transfer, should perform best in
scenarios such as the one in Niger.7
In the case of both nutrition-specific assistance and nutrition-sensitive assistance, the provisions of
the programme under study are inframarginal. This suggests that the effects hypothesised are driven
by income effects (Cunha, 2014). The analysis draws a contrast between temporary (nutrition-
specific) and semipermanent (nutrition-sensitive) income effects.
3. The intervention
3.1. Programmes
Malnutrition in Niger is multicausal.8 Consequently, WFP assistance works towards three objectives that
encompass these causes: (a) to reduce constraints and adverse seasonal impacts on lives and livelihoods,
(b) to support integrated safety nets, and (c) to increase the access of the poor to assets and food. The first
two objectives are targeted through nutrition-specific RUTF, including targeted food assistance (TFA),
blanket supplementary feeding (BSF), and targeted supplementary feeding (TSF). The TFA and BSF are
available to all families in target villages; the TSF is available only to households with children below the
moderate acute malnutrition threshold. The study formed the NSO group from households that reported
they had received the BSF, TFA, or TSF during the previous calendar year.
The third objective is targeted through the nutrition-sensitive FFA Programme, which operates in
two steps. First, households are supplied with tree seedlings and grow the trees on arid land,
providing a lumber asset. Second, the growth of the trees facilitates land rehabilitation. At end
line, all households that have qualified for the FFA also report that they receive at least one form of
nutrition-specific assistance, thus forming the NSNS treatment group. Different forms of assistance
are variously provided throughout the year (Table 1).
In the case of the BSF and TFA, all households in identified villages (see below) receive an RUTF
allowance. Those that receive the BSF receive an allowance valued at 200 calories per child per day;
TFA households receive an allowance valued at 620 calories per day. TSF recipients receive 92
calories per day per child under age 5. The FFA aims to deliver 620 calories per day through the use
of assets and farming on the rehabilitated land.
58 T. Brück et al.
3.2. Targeting
Rollout takes place geographically in three stages. First, priority districts are defined using indicators
of food security, nutrition, livelihoods, population movement, and infrastructure. Aid is provided,
according to the budget, to the districts with the worst characteristics. The criteria led to the
identification of 70 priority districts, although budget cuts meant that assistance only reached 37 of
the districts during the period of the study; the 33 districts exhibiting the least poor indicators were
deselected. This phase-out is the backstop in the empirical strategies.
Second, villages within priority districts are targeted on the basis of food availability and local
adjustment capacity. This includes villages in which more than 30 per cent of the population is food
insecure and global acute malnutrition has been above the 15 per cent emergency threshold at least
twice in recent years. All qualifying villages in priority districts receive assistance. The final stage
selects very poor households in these villages. These households are identified by implementation
partners, village committees, and WFP according to a household economy approach. Assistance is
available to all very poor households in target villages.
The budgets available for NSNS programming differ based on priorities set by WFP and donors.
Thus, NSO is available to all very poor households in all identified villages in the 37 priority areas.
NSNS is also available in all 37 priority areas, but is restricted to the villages with the worst relevant
nutrition indicators.
4. Data and methods
The study draws on panel data from a two-wave survey supported by WFP. Each wave includes
household socioeconomic and demographic information and anthropometric measurements of each
child. The anthropometric measurements are matched to questions about whether households had
received certain forms of WFP assistance during the previous year. Analyses then evaluate the
relevant dynamic differences in nutrition status between baseline and end line using a difference in
differences model. The following formula is thus estimated:
Nutritionihvt ¼ β1After þ β2Treatihvt þ β3Treat  Treatihv þ β4Xihvt þ 2ihvt (1)
where Nutrition captures the nutrition status of child i, in household h, in village v, at time t; After is
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for all end line observations and 0 for baseline observations;
Treat is a variable that defines the assistance group into which a given child falls; After  Treat is the
interaction of these two variables and isolates the programme impact; X is a vector of control
variables; and 2 is the regression error term.
The baseline was collected in March 2014 before the PRRO was rolled out, while the end line was
collected at the end of September 2017 after the PRRO period. The baseline is a representative
sample of very poor households in the 70 priority areas (m ¼ 3; 517 households). Anthropometric
measures are taken for each child ages 0–59 months (n ¼ 5; 527 children in 236 villages). The end
Table 1. Sequencing intervention types throughout the year
Month





Source: Construction based on WFP (2016).
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line resampled all households and children in the baseline (n ¼ 3; 482 children from m ¼ 1; 694
households in 200 villages).9 The treatment group splits at end line are shown in Table 2.
Because of the intrahousehold movement of children and high mortality and birthrates, the study
has a balanced panel n T ¼ 2; 804 children. The reasons for attrition beyond these local factors can
be split into exogenous and structural reasons. Two events took place during data collection that
exogenously reduced end line response. First, security in Diffa deteriorated because of the activities
of Boko Haram, and enumerator teams did not visit this area. Second, an enumeration team was
attacked and robbed in Tillaberi, which resulted in the loss of the data collected in this region. In both
cases, all observations within those areas were lost.
There remain significant differences at baseline between remainer and attritor households (exclud-
ing those lost in Diffa and Tillaberi), many of which – such as agroecological zone – are worse for
attritors and hold obvious ties to household nutrition outcomes (Table 3).10
To overcome attrition, the analysis treated it as a selection problem (Heckman, 1979). It posited that
the day a village was scheduled for enumeration represents a valid criterion for this approach. If
a household is in a village that was visited on a Friday, it is significantly less likely to be present in the
end line. Niger is an overwhelminglyMuslim country, and a large share of the population observes Friday
prayers, with an associated reduction in the productivity of the enumeration activities on that day. Because
data collection took place in a formalised manner, with teams travelling in circles from regional capitals
and visiting one village per day, the only determinant of whether a given village was visited on a Friday
was the day the enumeration in a region started, which was random. There are thus no reasons to believe
that nutrition status determines whether or not a village was visited on a Friday.
The analysis estimated the following selection equation by probit:
Attritionðt1jtÞ ¼ δ1Fridayvt þ δ2Fridayvt þ δ2Xivt1 þ 2it1 (2)
where Attrition  is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if a household leaves the sample and 0
otherwise; Fridayvt is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if a household is resident in village v that
was visited on a Friday at end line and 0 otherwise; X is other exogenous control variables at baseline
time t  1; δj are the regression coefficients for variables j; and 2 is the regression error term for
a given household.
The results from Equation (2) are presented in Table 4. This approach is used to generate the
inverse Mills ratio, which is included directly in the analysis.
Given local norms, the level of attrition may be structured differently at the individual and household
levels. The nutrition indicators are therefore averaged over the household, and further analyses are
conducted on the panel. This generates a balanced (household) panel n T ¼ 2; 446.11 As before, the
inverse Mills ratio from the Friday selection criterion is included to account for attrition.
The targeting of the PRRO on regions and villages with the worst observable nutrition indicators
raises a second source of endogeneity. To investigate this bias, the study compared the mean of the
key variables in each group. In these analyses, a random distribution of assistance would imply no
differences between these means. The difference is tested using a standard t-test (Table 5).
Table 2. Defining the assistance receiving groups
End line status
No assistance
No FFA but at Least one of TFA,
BSF
FFA and at least one of TFA,
BSF
Baseline status FFA only Reference
group
NSO NSNS
Prop. sample, % 52.28 19.00 25.31
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Households in the reference group tend to be larger than average, while households in the NSNS
treatment group are smaller, although households in both treatment groups have more children aged
0–5. NSNS households are more likely to have a woman head of household, are less likely to be
polygamous, and display higher than average access to livestock and assets. The study overcame the
associated biases in two ways. The first is an IV in which an instrument that is correlated with the
endogenous variables is included, but not the regression error term.
Each endogenous variable is first regressed on all exogenous regressors and the IV:
Table 3. Attrition analysis: T-test comparison of sample means
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Remainers Attritors Difference
Poverty status 1.172622 1.016892 0.1557***
Agroeconomic zone 2.037867 1.172297 0.8656***
Male child <5 months 0.0583111 0.0709459 −0.0126
Male child 6 < 59 months 0.5788444 0.6182432 −0.0394
No. male family members 3.018667 3.111486 −0.0928
Female child <5 months 0.0583111 0.0540541 0.0043
Female child 6 < 59 months 0.5488 0.4594595 0.0893**
No. female family members 3.25 3.140444 0.109556
Gender household head 1.231289 1.25 −0.0187
Marital status household head 1.630044 1.712838 −0.0828
Age household head 44 45.78258 −1.7826**
Education household head 1.5984 1.658784 −0.0604
Employment household head 4.264356 4.358108 −0.0938
Income household head 1.440356 1.442568 −0.0022
Water source 1.703289 1.719595 −0.0163
Toilet type 4.029867 4.135135 −0.1053
Energy supply 2.874667 2.959459 −0.08479***
House tenure type 1.646044 1.307432 0.3386***
Owns chair 1.049422 1.084459 −0.0350***
Owns carpet 0.1701333 0.1351351 0.0350*
Owns table 0.8312889 0.4527027 0.3786***
Owns bed 0.0311111 0.0202703 0.0108
Owns mat 0.6792889 0.4358108 0.2435***
Owns jewelry 0.9308444 0.9831081 −0.0523***
Owns iron 0.1139556 0.0472973 0.0667***
Owns sewing machine 0.0186667 0.0202703 −0.0016
Owns telephone 0.0083556 0.0067568 0.0016
Owns TV 0.4243556 0.3614865 0.0629**
Owns radio 0.0060444 0.0168919 −0.0108**
Owns hoe 0.2007111 0.1824324 0.0183
Owns plough 0.8954667 0.847973 0.0475***
Owns motorbike 0.1431111 0.1047297 0.0384**
Owns bike 0.0344889 0.027027 0.0075
Owns lamp 0.0177778 0.0168919 0.0009
Owns other asset 0.9367111 0.8614865 0.0752***
Has animals 0.0307556 0.9831081 −0.9524
Has cows 0.6449778 0.3716216 0.2734***
Has sheep 0.5847111 0.2837838 0.3009***
Has goats 1.314667 0.4560811 0.8586***
Has camels 2.128356 0.902027 1.2263***
Has donkeys 0.0698667 0.0067568 0.0631**
Has horses 0.5363556 0.1047297 0.4316***
Note: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
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Treatihv ¼ ϕo þ ϕ1Xit þ ϕ2IV þ 2ivht (3)
where Treatihv is the treatment status of individual i in household h and village v; X is the vector of
exogenous control variables; IV is the instrument; ϕj are regression coefficients; and 2 is the
regression error term.
The analysis identified the spatial lag of violence during the period shortly before the end line survey was
collected (see Ferguson & Michaelsen, 2015, for baseline work using this instrument; Brück & Ferguson,




1 child is in both waves
0 only baseline





Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
Table 5. Group-based mean differences
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Reference group NSO NSNS
Household size 0.294* 0.269 −0.552***
(2.47) (1.68) (−4.17)
Children ages 0–5 0.0216 0.0621** 0.0700***
(1.39) (2.98) (−4.03)
Female household head −0.0132 −0.0362* 0.0415**
(−1.09) (−2.22) (3.07)
Number of wives 0.0759*** 0.00873 −0.101***
(3.9) (0.33) (−4.64)
Livestock index −0.276*** −0.00854 0.352***
(−5.05) (−0.12) (5.76)
Assets index 0.0767 −0.338*** 0.139*
(1.52) (−5.02) (2.47)
Region −0.155 0.434** −0.107
(−1.46) (3.1) (−0.93)
Child, moderate acute malnutrition 0.00573 0.00662 −0.0117
(0.75) (0.64) (−1.37)
Child, mid-upper arm circumference −0.906* 0.331 0.901
(−2.16) (0.59) (1.92)
Height-for-age Z −0.07 −0.0922 0.152**
(−1.36) (−1.33) (2.63)
Notes: Table shows t-test comparisons of end line means of key variables according to group status. Column (1) shows
the comparison of the mean for the reference group, compared to pooled mean of the NSO and NSNS Groups; column
(2) for NSO, compared to the reference group and NSNS; and column (3) for NSNS compared with the reference group
and NSO. T-statistics in parentheses. Significance level: * = 10 per cent, ** = 5 per cent, *** = 1 per cent.
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2018, for the use of the instrument in impact evaluation). The analysis uses the distance from a village to the
nearest violent event (other than those events took place in the village), as recorded by the United Nations
security team, in the three months before the end line. It includes the instrument alone and the interaction of
the instrument with time. Table 6 shows the correlations between the instruments and each treatment group.
As can be seen, ϕ4 is significantly different from zero in all settings.
12
The analysis also qualitatively justified the exclusion restriction. It relies on violence that took place in
a village that is not part of the unit of analysis. There are no grounds to believe that violence happening in
other villages should influence nutrition in the analysis village directly. Because violence may be spatial,
the analysis controls for violent events that took place in the community of observation.
Second, the study used PSM across treatment groups (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). This approach
accounts for the covariates that predict receipt of assistance. It matches on the full range of covariates
in the main econometric specifications. It fits a multinomial logit model on each household’s
treatment status, estimating the following:
Treatihv2 ¼ ψ0 þ ψ1Xihv1 þ ψ1Mihv1 þ 2ih2 (4)
where the treatment status Treatihv2 of individual i, in household h, village v, and, at period two, takes
values 1, 2, or 3; X is the vector of exogenous variables at baseline; M is the inverse Mills ratio; ψj
are regression coefficients; and 2ih2 is the error term. Once the probability of the presence of an
observation in each group is predicted, a Kernel-based PSM difference in differences is performed,
following Leuven and Sianesi (2018). Figure 1 shows the common support of this approach. The
results of this step are shown in Appendix A, Table A4.
The study thus involved four main analyses that generate the estimates on which the discussion of
the results is based. These are summed up in Equations (5) and (6):
Nihvt ¼ β1After þ β2Treatihv þ β3After  Treatihv þ β4Xihvt þ β5M þ 2ihvt (5)
where N is the nutrition outcome of interest, and M is the included inverse Mills ratio. Otherwise,
Equation (5) is as described in Equation (1).
Nhvt ¼ β1After þ β2Treathv þ β3After  Treathv þ β4Xhvt þ β5M þ 2hvt (6)
where N is the average nutritional status of all children in household h in village v at time t. The
remainder of the equation is as described in Equations (1) and (5). Subsequently, Equations (5) and
(6) are estimated using the instrumental variables and PSM approaches. Xhivt and Xhvt comprise the
size of the household, the number of children under age 5 in the household, the gender of the head of
household, the number of wives in the household, an index of household assets, and security data
according to the requirements of the instrument.
Each equation is estimated three times. The first estimation compares the impact of receiving
NSNS with the impact of no assistance (the reference group). The second estimation repeats this
Table 6. Testing the correlation between group belonging and the instrumental variable
(1) (2) (3)
Variables NSOvRG NSNSvRG NSNSvNSO
Spatial lag −0.000233*** 0.000924*** 0.00122***
Insecurity (5.75e–05) (5.94e–05) (8.11e–05)
Observations 3,646 3,631 3,631
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
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process to compare the impact of NSO with the reference group. The third estimation compares the
NSNS and NSO treatment groups to test the relative effects of the different treatment combinations.13
5. Results
The results of the PSM analyses are presented as the preferred specification because of the maximum extent
of bias that might arise in instrumenting the NSO treatment. The results are shown in Tables 7–9. Table 7
compares the outcomes among the NSNS and reference groups; Table 8 compares the outcomes among the
NSO and reference groups, and Table 9 compares the outcomes among the NSNS and NSO groups. The
results of the instrumental variables analyses are presented in Appendix A, Tables A1–A3, but exhibit no
major differences. Each table contains eight columns. Columns 1–4 exhibit the results of the individual-level
analyses, and columns 5–8 show the household-level results. Columns 1 and 5 show results from the
MUAC z-score; columns 2 and 6 from the continuous MUAC score; columns 3 and 7 from the weight-for-
age z-score (WAZ); and columns 4 and 8 for the height-for-age z-score (HAZ). BothMUACmeasurements
capture variations in short-term nutritional outcomes; WAZ and HAZ capture longer-term impacts.
At the child level, three key trends emerge. First, the receipt of NSNS, certainly in terms of shorter-term
indicators, boosts nutrition outcomes relative to the reference group. The scale of the effect is large
compared with the other control variables. Recipients of NSNS show an increase in MUAC of 1.916
millimeters relative to the reference group. This is more than three times the impact that an exogenous,
marginal increase in household assets would have. Although similar movements are not evident in weight-
for-age, height-for-age is also positive and significant, suggesting longer-term gains.
Second, there are no differences between the NSO treatment group and the reference group. Given
the timing of the end line survey, it is not clear if NSO assistance has no impact at all or if the impacts
are lost over the medium term. It is also unclear if this finding relates to a general convergence in the
nutritional status of the reference and NSO groups, to the relative effects of makeshift coping
strategies, or to the ineffectiveness of these programmes if they are provided in isolation. Finally,
there is strong evidence that children in the NSNS treatment group are significantly more well off
than those in the NSO group across all nutritional indicators. Although this follows logically from the
Figure 1. Common support in PSM across treatment groups.
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previous two findings, it reinforces the importance of nutrition-sensitive programming and suggests
these effects might also be traced to longer-term indicators.
These findings are more compelling if they are considered at the household level. In this case, the effects
are more substantial in the short-term and long-term indicators among the NSNS treatment group relative to
both the NSO treatment group and the reference group, and there is little difference between the NSO
treatment group and the reference group. This is important for two reasons. First, it suggests that the child-
level gains are not the result of intrahousehold shifts in resource allocation, but, rather, real gains based on
eithermore effective use of food or increased food availability. Second, it provides grounds to believe that the
FFA has impacts on longer-term nutritional trends, as well as on shorter-term nutritional trends.
6. Discussion and conclusions
The study shows that, although it may have resulted in a temporary improvement in nutrition
indicators during the project period, nutrition-specific programming has otherwise had no effect.
The study also shows that the combination of nutrition-sensitive assistance and nutrition-specific
assistance has a pronounced positive impact on a range of nutritional outcomes relative to the
receipt of no assistance. Finally, the study shows that the combination of nutrition-specific
assistance and nutrition-sensitive assistance outperforms the receipt of only nutrition-specific
assistance. Despite the strength of these findings, it is important to be precise about what the
findings capture. Although the findings point to the key role of the FFA, attribution must be
considered more carefully. At worst, the FFA plays a major role in boosting the performance of
other forms of assistance. However, one cannot ascertain if these impacts are delivered by the
FFA or by the interaction of the FFA with other forms of assistance. Future work might examine
attribution more deeply.
The combination of results confirms the relationships hypothesised in the study and supports the
notion that typical theories of change associated with nutrition programming are complicated
in situations of chronic malnutrition or fragility. The application of this logic suggests that nutrition-
sensitive programmes should play an important role in nutrition aid in such contexts. Despite longer
causal chains and more complicated theories of change, these results are largely intuitive. Food
insecurity and malnutrition are related as much to income constraints as knowledge constraints (Baird
et al., 2014), while the relevant causal chains are less prone to interruption by violence or fragility.
Though intuitive, these results are important for a number of reasons. First, they show that
nutrition-sensitive programmes appear to be more suited to deliver impacts in complicated fragile
environments associated with chronic food security concerns.
Second, at least for as long as any impacts on asset accumulation endure, the results suggest that
FFA-style nutrition-sensitive programming is well placed to deliver ongoing nutritional benefits,
although the specific commodities provided and how they are delivered will require careful scrutiny
in other environments. At least in cases where malnutrition is the outcome of an income constraint, it
is plausible to believe that assistance bundles containing the FFA are optimally placed to deliver
sustained impacts.
Third, little rigorous evidence is available on the performance of food aid programmes in challen-
ging fragile and conflict-affected environments. This likely relates partly to the data-quality issues
and rollout constraints faced in the study. The series of methodological innovations in the study help
overcome these concerns and produce theoretically valid, empirically confirmed, and robust findings.
Not only do the findings suggest that certain forms of food aid boost nutrition in challenging
environments, but also that these improvements may endure into the medium term.
The findings demonstrate that positive spillovers accompany food aid programmes in particular
and development and humanitarian aid projects more generally. They show that development
interventions intended for one purpose, such as, in the case of the FFA, the development of
household assets, can develop positive outcomes elsewhere, such as nutrition status in this case.
Although this partly fits in with a wider literature, the modality under investigation here is rather
68 T. Brück et al.
different. It implies that providing a small amount of nutrition-sensitive assistance may induce
additional positive investments in nutrition in recipient households.
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Notes
1. Some debate has questioned whether or not these interventions might distort production incentives or other aspects of local food
markets (Abdulai, Barrett, & Hoddinott, 2005; Barrett, Mohapatra, & Snyder, 1999; Bezu & Holden, 2008; Gelan, 2007;
Schultz, 1960; Stevens, 1978; Tadesse & Shively, 2009). A recent review (Ruel, Quisumbing, & Balagamwala, 2018) discusses
the role of nutrition-sensitive agriculture. However, agriculture is only one of multiple key domains in which nutrition-sensitive
programming can exist. Boosts to assets and income feature less prominently in the programme-level literature.
2. The results are significant at 5 per cent and are robust across three other nutrition indicators: a z-score of the MUAC,
a z-score of weight-for-age, and a z-score of height-for-age.
3. Although interesting work measures conflict at the individual level (Brück, Justino, Verwimp, Avdeenko, & Tedesco,
2015; Justino, Brück, & Verwimp, 2013), the collection of relevant data has not been possible. Testing how private
exposure to violence interrupts programme benefits would be revealing, but is beyond the scope and capacity of this study.
4. There is some risk that assets could be misappropriated or destroyed by violent actors, although this is not unique to
nutrition-sensitive programming. There is no evidence that this occurred in Niger.
5. This is not to suggest that conflict is not associated with the risk of the onset of food crises (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011),
although this is common across the nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive typologies.
6. If the convergence period is longer than three months after the programme (when the end line data are collected), the NSO group
exhibits better nutrition outcomes than the reference group (H1). If it is shorter, no difference between the groups is observed (H2).
7. Langendorf et al. (2014) also suggest the need for additional rigorous evidence to confirm these findings. This is
particularly important because Hoddinott, Sandstrom, and Upton (2018) suggest that households receiving food baskets
showed larger impacts on dietary diversity than households that received cash. This study addresses this important
programmatic level gap in Niger.
8. A reliance on rain-fed agriculture and weather shocks in Niger (Shideed, 2017) has led some of the worst malnutrition
indicators in the world. Among children, 14.8 per cent suffer global acute malnutrition (Institut National de la Statistique,
Niger [INS] & ICF International, 2013). Half the country’s regions show levels of global acute malnutrition above the
emergency threshold set by the World Health Organisation. One child in three is underweight, and chronic malnutrition
affects 42 per cent of children under 5 (Concern Worldwide, 2013).
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9. The data include all children ages 0–59 months at the time of baseline data collection and all children who were newly
born in the households in the baseline sample.
10. Because the study only observed the assistance received by households at end line after the collection of the survey, it
could not observe the treatment groups to which attritor households belonged. Thus, the analysis cannot directly show that
attrition is not a function of the treatment received. Other results produced through the empirical specifications suggest,
however, that attrition should be unrelated to treatment status. Tables 3 and 5 show some of the determinants of attrition
and assistance receipt, respectively. The variables that are different between attritor and remainer households seldom
overlap with those that determine group membership. Where they do, the implication of the signs of the coefficients are
unclear. For example, attritors show elevated access to some household assets, and less access to others, with no obvious
hierarchy in the indicators. By contrast, the NSO group has fewer assets than the pooled mean of the other groups; the
reference group exhibits no difference; and the NSNS group has more assets.
11. This should not be taken to imply that there are households in the end line that were not present at baseline. Rather, it
means that there were households in the baseline household survey on which there are no baseline anthropometric
measurements; however, these appear at end line.
12. Comparison of these correlations against the Stock-Yogo thresholds suggests a maximum bias of less than 1 per cent in
analysing NSNS versus NSO and NSNS versus the reference group and a maximum bias of about 12 per cent to
13 per cent in analysing NSO versus the reference group.
13. A more standard econometric model would include all treatment groups in a single equation. This is not done so for two
practical reasons. First is the implied increase in the number of instruments required; second is that many more data would
be excluded in the PSM approaches.
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Appendix A. Additional tables
Table A1. Child- and household-level IV analyses of NSNS versus reference group outcomes
Individual panel results Household panel results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables MUACZ MUAC WAZ HAZ MUACZ MUAC WAZ HAZ
NSNS vs RG −0.72*** −6.17*** −0.11 −0.59** −0.88*** −8.16*** −0.15 −0.82***
(0.17) (2.03) (0.19) (0.26) (0.15) (1.92) (0.18) (0.24)
Time(NSNS vs RG) 0.92*** 5.59 0.22 0.49 1.15*** 8.23*** 0.64** 1.26***
(0.36) (3.49) (0.33) (0.44) (0.25) (2.98) (0.27) (0.37)
Time −0.30** 6.17*** −0.18 −0.13 −0.17* 3.16*** −0.29*** −0.36***
(0.12) (1.23) (0.12) (0.16) (0.09) (1.06) (0.10) (0.13)
IMR Friday visit 0.31 7.13** 0.36 −0.95** −0.20 −0.24 −0.49* −1.44***
(0.33) (3.56) (0.34) (0.45) (0.25) (2.85) (0.26) (0.35)
First-stage F-statistic 66.53 89.35 90.72 89.42 138.7 158.7 159.9 159.4
Observations 1,579 2,062 2,057 2,059 2,911 3,538 3,525 3,529
R-squared 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01
Notes: Child-level IV difference in differences estimation on the balanced panel subsample of NSNS group and
reference group households (columns 1–4) and household-level IV difference in differences estimation on the
balanced panel subsample of NSNS group and reference group households (columns 5–8). The dependent
variables are children’s anthropometrics. NSNS vs RG is a dummy that takes value 1 if the child lives in
a household that belongs to the NSNS treatment and 0 if the child lives in a household that belongs to the
reference group; Time takes value 1 in 2016 and 0 in 2014. The Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) correction is based on
whether the household is in a village that was visited on a Friday. Control variables include: household size,
number of children under five, household head gender, household head education, and number of wives in the
household. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
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Table A2. Child- and household-level IV analyses of NSO versus reference group outcomes
Individual panel results Household panel results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables MUACZ MUAC WAZ HAZ MUACZ MUAC WAZ HAZ
NSO vs RG 2.26 14.68 −1.06 −0.01 2.03*** 16.64** −0.92 0.56
(1.44) (11.77) (1.28) (1.35) (0.69) (7.63) (0.77) (0.93)
Time(NSO vs RG) −6.39* −31.22 −1.80 −1.37 −2.87*** −20.22** −1.17 −2.27*
(3.79) (20.85) (2.31) (2.47) (1.01) (10.05) (1.03) (1.26)
Time 1.58 14.90*** 0.30 0.27 0.80*** 9.70*** 0.06 0.37
(1.03) (5.40) (0.60) (0.64) (0.25) (2.45) (0.25) (0.31)
IMR Friday visit 0.75 6.20 0.13 −1.46*** −0.16 −0.07 −0.96*** −1.98***
(0.84) (4.52) (0.48) (0.52) (0.32) (3.24) (0.33) (0.40)
First-stage F-statistic 1.774 3.877 3.621 3.534 11.81 16.55 16.24 15.68
Observations 1,463 1,897 1,890 1,893 2,626 3,192 3,179 3,182
Notes: Child-level IV difference in differences estimation on the balanced panel subsample of NSO group and
reference group households (columns 1–4) and household-level IV difference in differences estimation on the
balanced panel subsample of NSO group and reference group households (columns 5–8). The dependent
variables are children’s anthropometrics. NSO vs RG is a dummy that takes value 1 if the child lives in
a household that belongs to the NSO treatment and 0 if the child lives in a household that belongs to the
reference group; Time takes value 1 in 2016 and 0 in 2014. The Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) correction is based on
whether the household is in a village that was visited on a Friday. Control variables include: household size,
number of children under five, household head gender, household head education, and number of wives in the
household. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
Table A3. Child- and household-level IV analyses of NSNS versus NSO group outcomes
Individual panel results Household panel results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables MUACZ MUAC WAZ HAZ MUACZ MUAC WAZ HAZ
NSNS vs NSO −0.25 −3.18 −0.05 −1.03*** −0.50*** −5.56*** −0.23 −1.10***
(0.17) (2.00) (0.19) (0.26) (0.14) (1.73) (0.16) (0.22)
Time(NSNS vs NSO) 1.07*** 8.31** 0.64* 1.22*** 0.85*** 7.62*** 0.89*** 1.65***
(0.35) (3.48) (0.34) (0.45) (0.23) (2.66) (0.25) (0.33)
Time −0.53*** 2.04 −0.56*** −0.61** −0.30** −0.30 −0.73*** −0.87***
(0.20) (2.05) (0.20) (0.26) (0.15) (1.70) (0.16) (0.21)
IMR Friday visit −0.04 −2.48 −0.40 −1.53*** −0.52 −7.19* −0.88** −1.05**
(0.41) (4.47) (0.43) (0.57) (0.33) (3.82) (0.36) (0.48)
First-stage F-statistic 53.71 68.33 69.09 66.85 136.1 153.2 153.0 150.5
Observations 840 1,101 1,099 1,096 1,535 1,848 1,844 1,841
R-squared 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.02
Notes: Child-level IV difference in differences estimation on the balanced panel subsample of NSNS group and
NSO group households (columns 1–4) and household-level IV difference in differences estimation on the
balanced panel subsample of NSNS group and NSO group households (columns 5–8). The dependent variables
are children’s anthropometrics. NSNS vs NSO is a dummy that takes value 1 if the child lives in a household that
belongs to the NSO treatment and 0 if the child lives in a household that belongs to the reference group; Time
takes value 1 in 2016 and 0 in 2014. The Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) correction is based on whether the household
is in a village that was visited on a Friday. Control variables include: household size, number of children under
five, household head gender, household head education, and number of wives in the household. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
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Table A4. Propensity score matching results
Individual panel Household panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables NSO NSNS NSO NSNS
Household size −0.062 0.796** −0.049 −0.014
(0.040) (0.033) (0.033) (0.030)
Children ages 0–5 years 0.137 0.292* −0.035 0.264*
(0.204) (0.166) (0.176) (0.140)
Woman household head 0.093 −0.015 0.083 −0.044
(0.213) (0.205) (0.182) (0.192)
Education household head −0.165** 0.103** −0.090* −0.006
(0.068) (0.050) (0.008) (0.048)
Number of wives in household −0.002 0.235* 0.008 0.161
(0.143) (0.122) (0.116) (0.107)
Assets index 0.087 −0.101** 0.116** 0.029
(0.054) (0.052) (0.045) (0.046)
Security 0.056 −0.167 −0.078 3.325***
(0.153) (0.142) (0.159) (0.330)
Constant −0.754*** −1.617*** −0.660*** −4.527***
(0.257) (0.226) (0.224) (0.357)
Observations 1,402 1,402 1,969 1,969
Notes: Child-level panel on household’s treatment status at end line (columns 1 and 2) and household-level panel
on household’s treatment status at end line (columns 3 and 4), estimated using multinomial logit models.
Columns 1 and 3 show determinants of belonging to NSO groups versus the reference group; columns 2 and
4 the determinants of belonging to the NSNS treatment group. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
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